

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 129-75  
19 AUGUST 1975

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00508R000300010031-5

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 129-75.4

1. LAOS: COMMUNIST-SPONSORED DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AN END TO VIENTIANE'S NEUTRAL STATUS ARE CONTINUING.<sup>4</sup>

TWO GROUPS OF SEVERAL HUNDRED EACH DEMONSTRATED IN SEPARATE PARTS OF THE CITY ON AUGUST 18. THE DEMONSTRATORS WERE ORDERLY, PEACEFUL, AND HEAVILY ESCORTED BY PATHET LAO TROOPS. THE COMMUNISTS SEEM UNABLE TO STIR UP ANY REAL ENTHUSIASM FOR THESE AFFAIRS, AND ONE MARCH WAS DESCRIBED AS MORE LIKE A FUNERAL PROCESSION THAN A POLITICAL RALLY. THE PARTICIPANTS PARROTED COMMUNIST SLOGANS, CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL OF NON-COMMUNIST LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.<sup>4</sup>

A FINAL MASS RALLY BY CITY RESIDENTS AND PEOPLE FROM SURROUNDING VILLAGES AUGMENTED BY PATHET LAO TROOPS ARE SUPPOSED TO CALL ON THE GOVERNMENT TO "LIBERATE" VIENTIANE BY CHANGING THE 1973 PEACE ACCORDS SO THAT THE CITY IS NO LONGER TERMED NEUTRAL.<sup>4</sup>

THE COMMUNISTS ARE CONCENTRATING ONLY ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF VIENTIANE CITY AND HAVE MADE NO APPARENT EFFORT TO USE THE

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RALLIES TO MAKE ANY FURTHER CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS STILL NOMINALLY A COALITION. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, NEW LOCAL OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SELECTED IN THE CITY'S FOUR DISTRICTS, BUT NO CHANGES HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED IN THE CENTRAL MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. CHINA, CAMBODIA AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED ON MONDAY IN PEKING BY CAMBODIA'S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KIEU SAMPHAN AND CHINESE VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING.4

SAMPHAN AND PRINCE SIHANOUK'S PEKING-BASED PRIME MINISTER, PENN NOUTH, ARRIVED TODAY IN PYONGYANG, WHERE THEY PROBABLY WILL CONFER WITH SIHANOUK. THE PRINCE HAS SPENT THE PAST THREE MONTHS IN THE NORTH KOREAN CAPITAL. {CONFIDENTIAL}

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 129-75-4

// ARGENTINA: THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF ARGENTINE ARMY COLONEL VICENTE DAMASCO AS INTERIOR MINISTER IS SUBSIDING. //4

//A RECENT COMMUNIQUE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON'S RIGHT TO NAME A MILITARY OFFICER TO THE CABINET, BUT DISSOCIATED THE ARMY FROM SUPPORTING HIM. THE ARMY, CITING THE LETTER OF THE LAW, DECLARED IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ONLY BY THE DEFENSE MINISTER OR BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. //4

//DAMASCO IS MOVING TO ASSUME DIRECTION OF THE DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT, WITH PERON AS A CEREMONIAL CHIEF OF STATE. HE HAS TRIED TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION BY IDENTIFYING STRONGLY WITH THE LATE JUAN PERON. THE NEW INTERIOR MINISTER CLEARLY SHOWED HIS INTENTION TO BE THE DOMINANT FORCE IN THE GOVERNMENT WHEN HE CLAIMED TO HAVE RECEIVED A NATIONAL PLAN--"POLITICAL IN NATURE"-- FROM JUAN PERON SHORTLY BEFORE THE LATTER'S DEATH. //4

//THE INTERIOR MINISTER ALSO SUGGESTED THAT HE FAVORS

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DECISION-MAKING BY CONSENSUS AND THAT HE OPPOSES THE AUTOCRATIC  
WAYS OF THE EXILED LOPEZ REGA.//4

//UNTIL HIS APPOINTMENT, THE 49-YEAR-OLD DAMASCO HAS SERVED  
AS MILITARY SECRETARY AND SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENCY.  
DESPITE THE RESULTING CLOSE CONTACT WITH LOPEZ REGA, DAMASCO  
MANAGED TO AVOID BECOMING CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE OUSTED  
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER.//4

//POLITICAL SKILL AS WELL AS A SOUND MILITARY REPUTATION NO  
DOUBT MADE THIS POSSIBLE; THESE SAME TRAITS PROBABLY ENABLED  
DAMASCO TO SURVIVE THE PURGE THAT FOLLOWED THE MILITARY'S OVERTHROW  
OF PERON IN 1955.//4

//IT REPORTEDLY WAS DAMASCO WHO CONVINCED THE PRESIDENT THAT,  
IN THE CURRENT CRITICAL SITUATION, THE CABINET REORGANIZATION WAS  
NECESSARY TO STAVE OFF A MILITARY COUP. HE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE  
IN SELECTING THE NEW MINISTERS, RESERVING FOR HIMSELF THE KEY  
MINISTRY, WHICH GIVES HIM IMPORTANT SECURITY AND POLITICAL RE-  
SPONSIBILITIES.//4

//ARMY CHIEF GENERAL NUMA LAPLANE STAUNCHLY SUPPORTS DAMASCO

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AND MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM TO TAKE THE INTERIOR PORTFOLIO. SINCE THE ARMY IS THE MOST POWERFUL SERVICE, DAMASCO IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN HIS POST, DESPITE THE RIFT HIS APPOINTMENT HAS CAUSED IN MILITARY UNITY. {SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM} //4

2. COLOMBIA: COLOMBIA HAS DECIDED TO PERMIT HIGHER CEILING PRICES FOR CRUDE OIL PRODUCED FROM BOTH OLD AND NEW WELLS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE EXPLORATION AND STEM DECLINING PRODUCTION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR HIGHER OIL PRICES, BUT HAS DELAYED TAKING ACTION BECAUSE IT WANTED TO AVOID REPERCUSSIONS FROM PUSHING UP ENERGY COSTS. //4

THE PRICE PAID BY COLOMBIAN REFINERIES FOR CRUDE FROM OLD WELLS WILL BE INCREASED TO \$3.50 A BARREL--UP FROM \$3.65 A BARREL, ONE OF THE LOWEST PRICES IN THE WORLD. OIL FROM NEW WELLS WILL COST FROM \$5.50 TO \$7 A BARREL; THE HIGHER PRICES WILL APPLY TO DEEP WELLS AND WELLS IN DISTANT REGIONS. //4

COLOMBIA'S OIL INDUSTRY HAS DETERIORATED SHARPLY BECAUSE OF THE PRICE CONTROLS. PRODUCTION HAS BEEN DECLINING SINCE 1970 AND EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL STOPPED IN EARLY 1974. EXPLORATION HAS ALSO

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FALLEN OFF. NO IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL WELL HAS BEEN DRILLED IN 11 YEARS, AND RECOVERABLE RESERVES NOW TOTAL 620 MILLION BARRELS-- ONLY TEN YEARS CONSUMPTION. //

WITH DEMAND FOR ENERGY RISING 8 PERCENT A YEAR AND OIL PRODUCTION FALLING RAPIDLY, FEAR OF A LARGE IMPORT BILL FOR OIL IS ADDING TO THE GOVERNMENT'S WORRIES. OIL IMPORTS COST \$3 MILLION LAST YEAR. //

MOST OIL COMPANIES, WHICH MUST GIVE PRIORITY TO COLOMBIA'S DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION, WILL REACT TO THE NEW PRICES BY EXPANDING PRODUCTION OF OIL FROM OLD WELLS. THIS WILL ALLOW COLOMBIA TO MEET ITS DOMESTIC REQUIREMENTS AT LEAST THROUGH 1976. THE COMPANIES WILL ALSO EXPAND EXPLORATION, BUT PRODUCTION FROM NEW DISCOVERIES PROBABLY WILL NOT ADD SUBSTANTIALLY TO DOMESTIC SUPPLIES BEFORE 1980. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 INPDET.4

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EUROPEAN BRIEF 129-75.4

1. PORTUGAL: PRIME MINISTER VASCO GONCALVES USED A LEFT-WING LABOR UNION RALLY MONDAY NIGHT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF LISBON TO APPEAL AGAIN FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT. PRO-GONCALVES SOURCES SAID THE RALLY WAS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS TO DRUM UP POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.4

GONCALVES' DECISION TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC—A RARE OCCURRENCE SINCE THE PRESENT CHALLENGE TO HIS LEADERSHIP BEGAN—FOLLOWED SEVERAL DAYS OF EMERGENCY MEETINGS WITH HIS CABINET AND RENEwed EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE VARIOUS Factions OF THE RULING ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT.4

THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUP LED BY MAJOR MELO ANTUNES IS CONTINUING ITS EFFORT TO REACH A COMPROMISE WITH THE RADICAL LEFTIST GROUP OF GENERAL OTELO DE CARVALHO. CARVALHO REPORTEDLY IS SEEKING ASSURANCES THAT THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT VEER TO THE RIGHT IF THE PRESENT REGIME

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XIX IS OUSTED. [REDACTED] HAS SAID THAT THIS REPUBLIC WEEK WILL BE DECISIVE, AND THE NEWSPAPER REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT THE TWO GROUPS HAD ALREADY REACHED AGREEMENT.

ONE KEY OFFICER WHO HAS REMAINED IN THE BACKGROUND DURING MOST OF THE PRESENT POWER STRUGGLE IS ADMIRAL ROSA COUTINHO. THE AMBITIOUS ADMIRAL TRAVELED TO HAVANA ON MONDAY TO BEGIN A TWO-WEEK VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA. AFTER SPENDING A WEEK IN CUBA, HE WILL HEAD THE PORTUGUESE DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE OF NONALIGNED NATIONS IN LIMA—which PORTUGAL IS ATTENDING AS AN OBSERVER—BEFORE RETURNING HOME ON SEPTEMBER 2. ROSA COUTINHO'S ABSENCE DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD MAY PERMIT HIM TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THE CURRENT STRUGGLE AND MAINTAIN HIS POSITION AND INFLUENCE WHATEVER THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME.

GONCALVES' COMMUNIST PARTY SUPPORTERS, MEANWHILE, HAVE SCHEDULED ANOTHER RALLY FOR TUESDAY IN THE NORTHERN CITY OF PORTO. THE COMMUNISTS' OBJECTIVE IN CONTINUING TO HOLD RALLIES WHERE THE PEOPLE ARE KNOWN TO BE OVERWHELMINGLY

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HOSTILE IS NOT YET CLEAR. IT MAY SIMPLY BE AN EFFORT BY THE COMMUNISTS TO ASSERT THEIR RIGHT TO MEET WHEREVER THEY CHOOSE, ALTHOUGH IT COULD, ALONG WITH GONCALVES' RE-EMERGENCE IN PUBLIC, BE THE INITIAL EFFORT IN A COMMUNIST COUNTEROFFENSIVE. THE 30-MINUTE GENERAL STRIKE CALLED FOR TUESDAY BY THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION TO PROTEST THE RECENT WAVE OF ANTI-COMMUNIST VIOLENCE HAS BEEN SCALED DOWN TO APPLY ONLY IN THE LISBON AREA.<sup>4</sup>

SECURITY FORCES ON MONDAY FIRED ON A MOB THAT ATTACKED AND DESTROYED THE COMMUNIST PARTY HEADQUARTERS IN PONTE DE LIMA, A SMALL TOWN NORTH OF PORTO. ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND 100 WERE INJURED.<sup>4</sup>

SPREADING VIOLENCE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS HAS ALSO SPREAD TO THE AZORES, WHERE THOUSANDS OF ANGRY FARMERS ON MONDAY DESTROYED OFFICES OF LEFT-WING PARTIES AND BEAT UP COMMUNISTS IN THE STREETS. FIFTEEN PERSONS WERE INJURED IN THE DISTURBANCES, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF TERCEIRA. THE

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PORtUGUESE CONTINGENT AT LAJES AIR BASE WAS PLACED ON ALERT.  
 ANTI-COMMUNIST SENTIMENT IN THE AZORES HAS BEEN A KEY MOTIVATING  
 FACTOR IN THE ISLANDERS' DRIVE FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM THE MAINLAND  
 AND RECURRING DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME COULD BE  
 EXPLOITED BY SEPARATISTS TO TRIGGER AN INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION.

{CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. ROMANIA: A ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT HAS SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS THE ONLY SOVIET EUROPEAN ALLY BREZHNEV HAS NEVER OFFICIALLY VISITED AND THAT GROMYKO HAS NOT OFFICIALLY VISITED THE COUNTRY SINCE SHORTLY AFTER HIS APPOINTMENT IN 1957.4

IF WHAT IS MEANT ARE FORMAL, BILATERAL VISITS ACCOMPANIED BY ALL THE USUAL PROTOCOL, THEN THIS ASSERTION IS CORRECT. IN THE DECADE SINCE CEAUSESCU ASSUMED POWER, HOWEVER, BOTH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO HAVE VISITED BUCHAREST FOR VARIOUS MULTILATERAL MEETINGS AND HAVE ALSO STOPPED BRIEFLY IN THE ROMANIAN CAPITAL WHEN PASSING THROUGH. THEIR LAST

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RECORDED VISITS WERE IN 1971, WHEN GROMYKO ATTENDED A WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN FEBRUARY AND BREZHNEV PULLED INTO BUCHAREST STATION IN APRIL EN ROUTE TO BULGARIA. ON THE LATTER OCCASION CEAUSESCU WAS NOT ON HAND TO GREET BREZHNEV. THIS SNUB WAS PROBABLY IN RETALIATION FOR ONE BY BREZHNEV THE YEAR BEFORE. AT THAT TIME, THE SOVIET PARTY CHIEF WAS TO HEAD A DELEGATION TO BUCHAREST FOR THE SIGNING OF THE LONG-DELAYED SOVIET-ROMANIAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY. TWO DAYS BEFORE THE VISIT BREZHNEV DEVELOPED A DIPLOMATIC ILLNESS AND COULD NOT TRAVEL. THE SAME DAY HE WAS TO ARRIVE IN ROMANIA, BREZHNEV ATTENDED A SOCCER MATCH IN MOSCOW.<sup>3</sup> IN 1968, BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, AND GRECHKO STOPPED IN IASI EN ROUTE TO A WARSAW PACT MEETING IN SOFIA, PROBABLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER ROMANIA WOULD SUPPORT MOSCOW'S STAND AGAINST DUBCEK'S "PRAGUE SPRING" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BY THAT TIME, HOWEVER, BREZHNEV

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WAS UNDOUBTEDLY WELL AWARE OF THE FUTILITY OF TRYING TO INFLUENCE CEAUSESCU--HAVING ATTEMPTED BUT FAILED TO SWERVE CEAUSESCU FROM HIS NATIONALIST COURSE DURING A "SECRET, UNOFFICIAL" VISIT TO BUCHAREST IN MAY 1966, AND AT A COMBINED WARSAW-PACT - CEMA EXTRAVAGANZA IN BUCHAREST IN JULY OF THE SAME YEAR.<sup>4</sup>

IN REVIEWING THE TRAVELS OF OTHER HIGH SOVIET OFFICIALS TO BUCHAREST DURING THE PAST DECADE, IT IS APPARENT THAT SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN IS THE MOST FREQUENT VISITOR. IN RECOGNITION OF A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH BUCHAREST--OR PERHAPS TO PUT PRESSURE ON CEAUSESCU--THE SOVIETS DID SEND KIRILENKO TO THE ROMANIAN PARTY CONGRESS LAST NOVEMBER. THE ROMANIAN PARTY PROGRAM, HOWEVER, CAUSED THE TEMPERATURE TO DROP AGAIN, AND THE KIRILENKO VISIT WAS THE LAST SOVIET ATTEMPT TO USE PERSONAL DIPLOMACY TO CHANGE THE INDEPENDENT ATTITUDE OF THE ROMANIANS. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 129-75.4

1. FEDAYEEN: LEADERS OF THE LESS RADICAL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN YASIR ARAFAT, MAY ADOPT MORE EXTREME POLICIES IN THE EVENT ANOTHER EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT IS IMPLEMENTED. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY AGREEMENT HAS ALREADY STRAINED EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS AND PROMPTED THE PALESTINIANS TO MOVE EVEN CLOSER TO SYRIA.<sup>4</sup>

ARAFAT, ACCORDING TO A PRO-FEDAYEEN NEWSPAPER IN BEIRUT, HAS SAID THAT HIS FATAH ORGANIZATION "REJECTS THE AMERICAN SETTLEMENT AND WILL RESIST IT THROUGH THE BARRELS OF OUR GUNS." ALTHOUGH SUCH RHETORIC IS USUALLY INTENDED FOR INTERNAL FEDAYEEN CONSUMPTION, IT MIGHT IN THIS CASE, PRESAGE AN INCREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ARAFAT'S POSITION. SINCE ARAFAT'S WIDELY PUBLICIZED APPEARANCE AT THE UN LAST YEAR, HIS PRESTIGE HAS DIMINISHED STEADILY AS A RESULT OF HIS FAILURE TO PRODUCE ANYTHING CONCRETE FOR THE PALESTINIANS.<sup>4</sup>

LAST MARCH, FATAH COMMANDOS RAIDED TEL AVIV IN AN EFFORT TO

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UNDERMINE SECRETARY KISSINGER'S ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE A SECOND EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT. THAT ATTACK HAD NO DIRECT EFFECT ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HELPED PROTECT ARAFAT AGAINST CHARGES BY FEDAYEEN "REJECTIONISTS" THAT HE WAS COOPERATING WITH EGYPT AND THE US IN THE FALSE HOPE THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD GAIN SOMETHING FROM NEGOTIATIONS.<sup>4</sup>

ARAFAT'S STRATEGY IN THE NEAR FUTURE WILL BE TO MINIMIZE THE DISAFFECTION OF LEADERS OF THE SYRIAN-CONTROLLED SAIQA GROUP AND THE MARXIST-ORIENTED POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE GENERALLY SUPPORTED HIS CONCILIATORY POLICIES ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. FAILING THIS, ARAFAT WILL TRY NOT TO BE VERY FAR BEHIND THEM IN ANY SWING TOWARD MORE RADICAL POLICIES ON POLITICAL STRATEGY AND THE USE OF TERRORISM.<sup>4</sup>

SYRIA'S STAND WILL BE THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE FORCE IN DETERMINING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE MORE CONCILIATORY FEDAYEEN GROUPS OPPOSE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT. IF THE EGYPTIANS ARE ABLE TO REASSURE SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD AND LIMIT SYRIAN CRITICISM OF EGYPT, THOSE PALESTINIANS WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO FOLLOW DAMASCUS'.

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SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY						7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	524	525	526	527	528	529	530	531	532	533	534	535	536	537	538	539	540	541	542	543	544	545	546	547	548	549	550	551	552	553	554	555	556	557	558	559	560	561	562	563	564	565	566	567	568	569	570	571	572	573	574	575	576	577	578	579	580	581	582	583	584	585	586	587	588	589	590	591	592	593	594	595	596	597	598	599	600	601	602	603	604	605	606	607	608	609	610	611	612	613	614	615	616	617	618	619	620	621	622	623	624	625	626	627	628	629	630	631	632	633	634	635	636	637	638	639	640	641	642	643	644	645	646	647	648	649	650	651	652	653	654	655	656	657	658	659	660	661	662	663	664	665	666	667	668	669	670	671	672	673	674	675	676	677	678	679	680	681	682	683	684	685	686	687	688	689	690	691	692	693	694	695	696	697	698	699	700	701	702	703	704	705	706	707	708	709	710	711	712	713	714	715	716	717	718	719	720	721	722	723	724	725	726	727	728	729	730	731	732	733	734	735	736	737	738	739	740	741	742	743	744	745	746	747	748	749	750	751	752	753	754	755	756	757	758	759	760	761	762	763	764	765	766	767	768	769	770	771	772	773	774	775	776	777	778	779	780	781	782	783	784	785	786	787	788	789	790	791	792	793	794	795	796	797	798	799	800	801	802	803	804	805	806	807	808	809	810	811	812	813	814	815	816	817	818	819	820	821	822	823	824	825	826	827	828	829	830	831	832	833	834	835	836	837	838	839	840	841	842	843	844	845	846	847	848	849	850	851	852	853	854	855	856	857	858	859	860	861	862	863	864	865	866	867	868	869	870	871	872	873	874	875	876	877	878	879	880	881	882	883	884	885	886	887	888	889	890	891	892	893	894	895	896	897	898	899	900	901	902	903	904	905	906	907	908	909	910	911	912	913	914	915	916	917	918	919	920	921	922	923	924	925	926	927	928	929	930	931	932	933	934	935	936	937	938	939	940	941	942	943	944	945	946	947	948	949	950	951	952	953	954	955	956	957	958	959	960	961	962	963	964	965	966	967	968	969	970	971	972	973	974	975	976	977	978	979	980	981	982	983	984	985	986	987	988	989	990	991	992	993	994	995	996	997	998	999	1000
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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

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INFO: FILE

INDEX      DISSEM BY:  
 NO INDEX  
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LEAD. THIS WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN ARAFAT. 4

MORE MAY BE KNOWN OF SYRIA'S POSITION ON A FURTHER EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT WHEN DAMASCUS RESPONDS TO THE LATEST PALESTINIAN INITIATIVE TO IMPLEMENT THE "PALESTINIAN-SYRIAN JOINT POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMAND." THE COMMAND WAS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY ASAD DURING THE MARCH ROUND OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROPOSAL LAY DORMANT UNTIL LATE LAST WEEK, HOWEVER, WHEN THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLED FOR THE "HIGHEST SPEED POSSIBLE" TOWARD SETTING UP A JOINT BODY THAT COULD TAKE A UNIFIED STAND ON "CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS." 4

IF SYRIA BECOMES DISILLUSIONED WITH EGYPT AND ABETS PALESTINIAN OBSTRUCTIONISM, ARAFAT AND HIS ASSOCIATES WILL MOVE TOWARD A MORE DIRECT AND FORCEFUL CRITICISM OF EGYPT, THE US, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IF UNCHECKED BY EGYPTIAN PROMISES OF EARLY NEGOTIATING PROGRESS ON PALESTINIAN ISSUES, THIS COULD LEAD ULTIMATELY TO A NEW ROUND OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ISRAEL AND ABROAD. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET-H

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